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1 Introduction
Modeling the economic choices of the family unit using dynamic macro-style frameworks has become
central in analyzing a range of issues and policies. One of the key decisions of a family is the fertility
choice. Deciding the number of children and the amount of resources to invest in each of them
has a long lasting impact on the economic outcomes of all family members. The use of dynamic
altruistic models of fertility choice was pioneered by the inuential work of Becker and Barro (1988)
and Barro and Becker (1989).1 Although the Barro-Becker model (BB model henceforth) is widely
used in macroeconomics, some of its predictions are either counterintuitive or hard to reconcile with
the data. Specically, the following are three controversial predictions of the model: (i) fertility is
independent of family income; (ii) children are a net nancial burden to society; and (iii) individual
consumption is negatively associated to individual income.
A well-known empirical regularity is that fertility declines with income (see Jones, Schoonbroodt
and Tertilt, 2008). A negative association is evident when looking at the cross-country data on
average fertility and per-capita income. Similar evidence is obtained when looking at a cross-
section of individuals within a country. For example, Becker (1960) nds a negative fertility-income
relationship in the 1910, 1940 and 1950 Censuses, and the Indianapolis survey for the 1900s. In
addition, using US Census data a far back as 1826, Jones and Tertilt (2006) estimate an income
elasticity of fertility of about  0:38 suggesting the importance of income as a determinant of fertility
in within-country micro data. However, the BB model is inconsistent with this evidence. In the
BB model fertility is independent of wage income, family income or in general, any level variable.
Instead, fertility depends positively on the interest rate, the degree of altruism and the growth of
child survival probabilities, while it depends negatively on the rate of technical progress and the
growth rate of social security. Although interest rates may play a role in explaining cross-country
fertility di¤erences (Manuelli and Seshadri, 2009), this mechanism may not be relevant to explain
fertility di¤erences within a country. The reason why in the BB model fertility is independent
of income is that it is fully determined by the intergenerational version of the Euler equation
rather than by the optimality condition for fertility. As resources can be freely reallocated across
generations through unconstrained bequests, the Euler equation pins down the value of fertility as
a function of the interest rate, but independently of income.
The BB model also predicts that individual consumption is proportional to the net nancial
cost of children. The intuition for this result is that when children are costly to produce then the
optimal "utilization rate," as given by childrens consumption, must be proportional to their net
cost (Becker and Barro, 1988, p. 10). Therefore, in order for consumption to be positive, children
must be a net nancial burden to parents in particular, and to society in general, meaning that
the nancial costs of raising a child must be larger than the nancial benets. Becker and Barro
(1988) acknowledge that this prediction may not hold in many countries, specially in modern ones.
Below we provide evidence showing that children, even those who end up as unskilled workers,
are a nancial gain rather than a nancial burden to society. Finally, the BB model predicts
1For a summary of the literature after Becker and Barro (1988) see Jones, Schoondbroot and Tertilt (2008).
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a negative association between individual consumption and individual income. This is because
the net nancial cost of a child is negatively associated to the future earnings of the child. This
prediction runs counter to standard consumption theory and a variety of evidence suggesting a
positive association between lifetime income and lifetime consumption.2
This paper shows that introducing credit frictions into the Barro-Becker model helps overturn
various controversial predictions of the frictionless version of the model. A critical assumption
underlying the predictions of the BB model is that the "bequest" or transfers parents give to
children is unconstrained, so the possibility of negative bequests is not ruled out. We start the
analysis by characterizing a model identical to BB except for the presence of a non-negative bequest
constraint, a constraint that is quite natural and plausible given that parents cannot legally impose
debt obligations on their children. We nd that when the bequest constraint binds individual income
becomes a determinant of fertility, individual consumption increases with income, and children are
not necessarily a nancial burden to society. Specically, in the constrained model optimal fertility
is determined by the comparison between marginal benets and marginal costs of children, rather
than by the intergenerational Euler equation. A negative fertility-wage relationship is obtained
when wages have a larger impact on the marginal cost of children than on the marginal benets.
Moreover, a binding bequest constraint also implies that parents cannot fully control the "utilization
rate" or consumption of their children: if childrens consumption is too high parents cannot reduce
it by leaving negative bequests. As a result, individual consumption is not proportional to the net
cost of raising children, consumption can be positive even if children are a net nancial benet to
society, and lifetime individual consumption responds positively to lifetime individual income.
We generalize our benchmark economy to a full life-cycle model with endogenous fertility, be-
quests, and schooling choices, as well as two di¤erent types of credit frictions: bequest constraints
and borrowing constraints for students. The main purpose of the more general model is to show
that various types of credit frictions, not necessarily bequest constraints, can give rise to similar
results. We analyze the properties of the life-cycle model in two steps. First, in order to discuss
how the relationship between income and fertility is a¤ected by the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution (EIS), we keep schooling exogenous. To focus on the fertility decision, we assume that the
interest rate is su¢ ciently low to induce the bequest constraint to bind along a steady state. The
resulting model resembles the Samuelson-Diamond OLG economy because bequests are absent, but
it di¤ers from it in that the parents altruism determines fertility and dynasty size endogenously.
We nd that an EIS larger than one is needed for the model to predict a negative fertility-wage
relationship. To see why, notice that since parents care about the utility of children, an increase in
wages (income) directly increases the marginal benet of having children through the increase in
the utility of the child. Regarding the marginal cost of having children, an increase in wages has two
opposing e¤ects: it increases the opportunity cost of foregone labor income as there is a time-cost
of raising children, but it decreases the marginal utility of income. For fertility to be a negative
function of income, it must be the case that the increase in the opportunity cost of foregone labor
2For example, standard consumption theory predicts that if the income of all individuals in a dynasty doubles
then the consumption of all individuals in the dynasty will increase. In the BB model, steady state consumption falls.
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income is strong enough to o¤set the decrease in the marginal utility of income. It turns out that
the larger the EIS, the more likely a negative fertility-income relationship would hold.
In a second step we allow the endogenous determination of schooling as well as fertility. In this
case the bequest constraint is not binding because parents need to nance the consumption of their
children during the schooling years, but the borrowing constraint is binding. The model captures
the idea that children depend on the resources of their parents and parents cannot legally charge
the children for the resources transferred to them.3 Although clear-cut analytical results cannot be
obtained for the general case, we derive some analytical insights and provide a numerical simulation.
We verify that a high EIS is still needed to generate a negative fertility-income relationship when
schooling choices are also endogenous. We also show that there is a quantity-quality trade-o¤: high
wage income individuals choose low fertility and high schooling. In sum, the key message of the
paper is that dynamic altruistic models of fertility with credit frictions give rise to more plausible
predictions than their frictionless counterparts.
Our paper is related to a large literature that uses dynamic altruistic models in order to study
fertility choices in macroeconomic models. Papers include Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990),
Alvarez (1999), Boldrin and Jones (2002), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Doepke (2004, 2005),
Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010), Manuelli and Seshadri (2009), Bar and Leukhina (2010) among
others. The main issue in this literature is that, as in the BB model, steady state fertility is
mainly determined by the interest rate and the growth rate of the economy, but not by income or
wages. Again, even though interest rates and growth rates may play a role explaining cross-country
di¤erences in fertility, di¤erences in wages appear to be also relevant in explaining the within-
country cross-sectional evidence on fertility. The contribution of our paper is to characterize the
conditions under which dynamic altruistic models of fertility choice in the tradition of Barro and
Becker are able to generate a negative fertility-income relationship. It turns out that credit frictions
and a high EIS are essential.
A parallel and complementary literature in macroeconomics studies fertility in non-altruistic
settings (i.e., those in which parents care about either the number of children, or their human
capital, but not directly about the utility of the children). Notable examples in this category of
papers include Galor and Weil (2000) and Greeenwood and Seshadri (2002), among others. In
these non-altruistic models, optimal fertility is determined from a comparison of marginal costs
and marginal benets of children. As discussed before, this is not the case in the BB model,
where fertility is ultimately linked to the interest rate, and not the cost of raising children. The
dynamic altruistic model with credit frictions we propose provides a link to non-altruistic models
in the sense that the implied theory of fertility is similar in both. However, there is an important
distinction between the two models: while the presence of altruism complicates our model, it also
endogenizes the value that parents give to the investments made on their children. This value is not
endogenous, but ad hoc, in non-altruistic settings and treated as a free parameter. The altruistic
3 In the frictionless version of the model both fertility and schooling depend on the interest rate but are independent
of parental or individual income. The frictionless model could explain both high fertility and low schooling choices
through high interest rates but also all individuals in the economy will choose the same fertility and schooling since
both choices are independent of individual income.
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model reduces the number of free parameters and provides added discipline. Furthermore, altruistic
models in which the value of childrens investments to the parent is endogenous are useful tools to
study situations in which one cannot plausibly assume parents exogenously value their childrens
investment di¤erently.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revisits the BB model, introduces
non-negative bequest constraints, and derives the main results of the paper regarding fertility
and consumption. Section 3 extends the benchmark model in Section 2 to a life-cycle model.
It examines both the role of the EIS in determining whether the fertility-income relationship is
positive or negative, as well as the presence of a quality-quantity trade-o¤. Concluding comments
are provided in Section 4 and the Appendix includes the details of the solutions to the di¤erent
models presented in the text.
2 The Becker-Barro model revisited
Becker and Barro (1988) study fertility choices within a simple dynastic model in which individuals
live one period and leave bequests to their children. Parents have children for altruistic reasons:
they care about the utility of their children. In this section we set up a slightly generalized version
of the BB framework, review the main ndings of the original BB model and highlight the following
controversial predictions of the model: (i) fertility is independent of family income; (ii) children
are a net nancial burden to society; and (iii) individual consumption is negatively associated to
individual income.
2.1 The model
Consider the problem of an individual, a parent, who lives for one period, period t, and derives
utility from consumption, ct, the number of children, nt 2 [0; N ], and the utility of the children,
Vt+1  0. The parental utility, Vt, satises
Vt = U(ct) + (nt)Vt+1 for t = 0; 1; :::; (1)
where U(c)  0 is the utility ow and (nt)  0 is the weight that parents place on the welfare
of their n children. It is assumed that (0) = 0; 0(n) > 0 and 00(n) < 0 meaning that parents
are altruistic toward children but at a decreasing rate. The restriction (N) < 1 is required for
utility to be bounded. Dene (n)  (n)=n as average altruism. Notice that (n) decreases with
n. Positive fertility choices require that utility ows and stocks (U and V ) are non-negative.4
4 If children add negative utility ows to their parents then parents would be better o¤ having no children. Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010) analyze cases with negative utility. See also Cordoba
and Ripoll (2011a).
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The parent at time t faces the following budget constraint
wt + yt + (1 + rt) bt = ct + (nt;wt) + ntbt+1; (2)
where wt is the wage rate, yt is non-labor income, bt are bequests per child, rt the interest rate, and
(n;w) is the total cost of raising n children. The dependence on w reects the time cost of raising
children.5 If time input is the only cost of raising children then (n;w) = (n)w. It is assumed
that n(n;w) > 0; nn(n;w)  0; and the marginal cost of rasing children increases with wages,
nw(n;w)  0.6
Dene net income as I(nt;wt; yt)  wt+yt (nt;wt). The following is a recursive representation
of the parents problem at time t  0 :
Vt(bt) = max
bt+10; Nnt0
U(I(nt;wt; yt) + (1 + rt) bt   ntbt+1) + (nt)Vt+1(bt+1): (3)
This problem incorporates a non-negative bequest constraint and a maximum number of potential
children, N . It is natural to introduce non-negative bequest constraint in the parental problem
because in practice parents cannot legally impose debt obligations on their children.
The BB framework is a special case of this model. They consider isoelastic functional forms
for U and ; a linear formulation for (n;w) and y = 0: The results below are stated in terms of
elasticities in order to provide easy comparison with the BB model. Denote by Fx () the elasticity
of function F with respect to variable x.
Example 1: BB model n (n) = 

n ; 
U
c (c) = 
U
c ; 

n(n) = 1 and y = 0: In particular, (nt) = n;
(n;w) = n(a + dw) where a is the goods cost of having children and 0  d < 1 is the time
cost.
The more general model above includes non-labor income, yt, and allows for general functional
forms for U ,  and (n;w): As discussed in Becker and Barro (1998), n (n) > 
U
c (c) is required
for the existence of an interior solution for fertility when bequest are unconstrained. We assume
this restriction holds. The following assumption is also convenient in order to obtain an interior
solution in the constrained case, as we discuss below.
Assumption 1. 
0(n)
1 (n) is decreasing in n for n 2 [0; N ]:
Two formulations of (n) that satisfy Assumption 1 as well as the restriction 0  (nt) < 1 for
any n  0 are (n) =  (1  e n) and (n) = n1+n for 0 <  < 1 and  > 0: The BB formulation
(n) = n needs an added restriction on the maximum number of children in order to satisfy
Assumption 1 as well as the restriction 0  (n) < 1.
5For example, if l is the time cost of raising children and x the goods cost, then (n;w) = minl;x fwl + xg subject
to n  zl x1  : In this case, (n;w) = bznw :
6Assumption nn(n;w)  0 is not necessary, but it will turn out to be su¢ cient in the Propositions below.
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2.2 Optimal decisions
The optimality condition for bequests is given by the following intergenerational version of the
standard Euler Equation:
U 0(ct)  U 0(ct+1) (1 + rt+1)(n) with equality if bt+1 > 0. (4)
The condition is similar to an Euler equation, except that the discount factor (n) is endogenous and
corresponds to the average degree of altruism toward children, while the consumptions correspond
to those of the parent and the child. For given interest rate, equation (4) with equality implies a
sort of quantity-growth trade o¤: higher nt is associated with a reduction in consumption growth
as ct+1 falls relative to ct.
The optimality condition for fertility is given by:7
U 0(ct) (bt+1 + n(nt;wt)) = 
0(nt)Vt+1(bt+1): (5)
The left hand side of equation (5) is the marginal cost of children. It includes the bequest to the
child plus the cost of raising a child both multiplied by the marginal utility of consumption. The
marginal benet on the other hand is the welfare of the child, Vt+1; times the parental weight
associated to the marginal child, 0. It is instructive to rewrite (5) as:
U 0(ct) = U 0(ct+1)
 
1 + rnt+1

0(nt); (6)
where
1 + rnt+1 
Vt+1(bt+1)=U
0(ct+1)
bt+1 + n(nt;wt)
is the gross return of having a child. To see this last statement, notice that Vt+1=U 0(ct+1) is the value
of a life in terms of goods and bt+1+n(nt;wt) is the marginal cost of creating a life. Comparing (6)
to (4) makes clear that fertility decisions are analogous to investment decisions, as pointed out by
Alvarez (1999), and that the returns on children and bequest must satisfy the arbitrage condition:
 
1 + rnt+1

0(nt)  (1 + rt+1) (nt)=nt:
Since (nt) is concave, this condition implies that in an interior solution 1 + rnt+1 > 1 + rt+1,
meaning that returns to having children need to be larger than the returns to assets. This is
because additional savings allow parents to provide each child with higher bequests which increase
the utility of the parent in proportion to their average degree of altruism, (nt)=nt; however, having
an extra child, holding bequests constant, increases the utility of the parent only in proportion to
7We focus the discusion on cases in which optimal fertility is interior and consider interior or corner solutions for
bequest. A su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition for positive fertility is that limn!00(n) =1:
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the marginal degree of altruism, 0(nt).
2.3 Steady state
We now characterize the steady state implications of equations (3), (4) and (5).8 Depending on
parameter values, the bequest constraint may bind or not. We rst discuss the case when bequest
are positive (unconstrained case), and then the case when bequest are zero (constrained case).
2.3.1 Unconstrained allocation
Let n, c and b denote the unconstrained steady state values of fertility, consumption and bequests
respectively. The unconstrained solution is characterized by the following equations (see details in
Appendix A):
1 = (1 + r)(n); (7)
c =
Uc (c)
n (n)  Uc (c)
[(1 + r)n(n;w)  w   y    (n;w) (n(n;w)  1)] ; (8)
and
b =
c  (w + y    (n;w))
1 + r   n : (9)
Equation (7) is the key result of the unconstrained model: it states that steady state fertility
is a sole and positive function of the interest rate. In particular, fertility is independent of level
variables such as w or y:9 Therefore, the unconstrained allocation does not generate a negative
relationship between fertility and income, contrary to what the data suggests. The reason is that
steady state fertility is fully determined by the intergenerational Euler equation, equation (4). In
the standard neoclassical growth (Ramsey) model with exogenous fertility and a given interest
rate, equation (4) determines the balanced growth rate of individual consumption. However, when
fertility is endogenous as in the BB model, the discount factor is endogenous and the role of the
intergenerational Euler equation is to pin down the value of the discount factor, and therefore
the underlying value of fertility. Notice that the rst order condition for fertility plays no role in
determining steady state fertility in the unconstrained solution. Therefore, considerations regarding
the costs and benets of having children do not a¤ect fertility choices but instead they determine
consumption choices, as we discuss next.10
Once fertility is determined by the interest rate, equation (8) determines steady state consump-
tion. Since n(n;w)  1; due to the assumed convexity of marginal costs, consumption is positive
8The original Barro-Becker model does not have transitional dynamics. Our more general model may have some
transitional dynamics depending on specic functional forms.
9More generally, equation (4) states that fertility depends positively on the interest rate and negatively on the
rate of consumption growth, but it does not depend on level variables such as y or w.
10Becker and Barro (1988) argue that this prediction arises from the neglect of human capital investments in their
model. If these investments were included, then the prediction of their model would be that the xed cost of raising
a child (the one that excludes human capital investments) is larger than the xed component of earnings (earnings
independent of human capital). Although Becker and Barro argue that this prediction more reasonable, they do not
provide a more systematic defense of it.
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only if the nancial cost of raising a child, (1 + r)n(n;w); is larger than the nancial benet, w+y;
meaning that children are a net nancial burden to parents and to society. This is a problematic
prediction of the model, particularly for rich countries, as recognized by Becker and Barro (1988,
p. 9). They also argue that this prediction arises from the neglect of human capital investments
in their model. If these investments were included, then the prediction of their model would be
that the xed cost of raising a child, one that excludes human capital investments, is larger than
the xed component of earnings, or earnings of unskilled workers. The available data however
suggests than the present value of earnings of unskilled individuals is signicantly larger than the
cost of raising a child. According to the USDA (2010), the typical total cost of raising a child
from birth to age 17 for a family of four in the lowest income group was $163,440 in 2010.11 These
expenses include direct parental expenses made on children through age 17 such as housing, food,
transportation, health care, clothing, child care, and private expenses in education. If an individual
works 40 hours a week 48 weeks a year from age 18 to age 65 earning the federal minimum legal
wage of $7.25 dollars per hour, then the present value of earnings is $696,000. Both of these gures
are incomplete, but the large gap between benets and costs is unlikely to disappear. For example,
the cost of rasing a child ignores the opportunity cost of parental time spend on children, a cost
that may be substantial but not enough to overcome the benets. Furthermore, the benets assume
only minimum wage earnings for unskilled workers during the entire life but wages are typically
increasing due to experience and technological progress.
Finally, another counterintuitive prediction of the unconstrained model is that consumption is
negatively related to non-labor income y; and possible to labor income too, according to equation
(8). In standard consumption theory a permanent increase of income for all generations increases
consumption for all of them. However, when fertility is endogenous, optimality now requires that
the utilization rate of an o¤spring, which is given by his/her consumption, be proportional to
the cost of having the child. Since non-labor income reduces the cost of having the child then
consumption must fall with non-labor income.
Given fertility and consumption, equation (9) provides optimal bequests. Equation (7) implies
that 1 + r   n = (1 + r) (1  (n)) > 0. Therefore, steady state bequests are non-negative if
c +  (n;w) > w + y: We now turn to discuss the constrained allocation which occurs when this
condition is violated.
2.3.2 Constrained allocation
Consider now the constrained solution. It is important to point out that although in this section we
analyze the steady state properties of the model in which bequests are zero, a more general life cycle
model with other types of credit frictions delivers the same implications we discuss here (section
3). As we show below, when children cannot borrow and depend on the resources of their parents,
then bequests are positive, but the determinants of fertility are similar to the ones discussed here.
What is essential is the presence of binding credit frictions, not necessary of a binding non-negative
11The USDA calculation assumes a zero interest rate but the main argument here is robust to various plausible
interest rates.
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bequest constraint.
The following is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the bequest constraint to bind in steady
state.
Assumption 2. 
U
c (c)

n(n;w)
n (n)
(n;w)
w+y (n;w) <
n
1+r n where n solves 1 = (1 + r)(n):
The condition in Assumption 2 follows after algebraically transforming condition c+ (n;w) <
w+ y, which as shown above induces zero bequests. To better understand this condition, consider
(n;w) = n(a + dw) as in the BB model. Assume further that a=w  0 which describes a rich
country in which w is high relative to a. In that case, the condition in Assumption 2 becomes
Uc
n
dn
1  dn <
n
1 + r   n =
(n)
1  (n) :
Since Uc =

n < 1; this condition states that the weight that parents give to their children, (n); needs
to be larger than the total fraction of time spent raising children, dn: According to this condition,
the bequest constraint binds if (Uc 

n)=n , the interest rate and the cost of raising children are
su¢ ciently low, or if wages are su¢ ciently high.12
While Assumption 2 is a necessary and su¢ cient condition, the following is a su¢ cient condition
for the bequest constraint to bind.
Assumption 3. limn!0 (1 + r)(n) < 1:
If Assumption 3 is satised then (1 + r)(n) < 1 for all feasible n since (n) decreases with n:
Therefore, the intergenerational Euler equation (4) with equality would imply that, for a constant
interest rate and any fertility rate, consumption is falling toward zero. Therefore, Assumption 3
guarantees that in any steady state with constant consumption the bequest constraint must be
binding so that (4) does not hold with equality. In words, when the interest rate is low and parents
do not attach enough weight to their descendants ((n) is low for any n) then it is optimal for
parents to leave negative bequest.
The advantage of Assumption 3 is its simplicity. It is satised, for example, by the functions
(n) =  (1  e n) or (n) = (n) =(1 + n) under the restriction (1 + r) < 1: However,
Assumption 3 is not satised by the BB function (n) = n: In this case, Assumption 2 can be
utilized.
Denote by n and c the steady state solutions in the constrained case. Equations (5) and (2)
in steady state become:
U 0(w + y   (n;w))n(n;w) =
0(n)
1  (n)U(w + y   (n
;w)): (10)
12A su¢ cient condition for this condition to hold is (1 + r) d < 1: In that case, it follows, using (7), that
(n)
1  (n) =
1
1=(n)  1 =
1
(1 + r) =n  1 >
1
1= (dn)  1 >
Uc
n
dn
1  dn :
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c = w + y   (n;w) (11)
The left hand side of (10) is the marginal cost of raising children while the right hand side is the
marginal benet. According to (10) the solution for n in the constrained model will depend in
general on w and y but not on r; contrary to the unconstrained version.
We now characterize key properties of the constrained allocation and contrast them with the
ones obtained for the unconstrained case. First, are children still a net nancial burden to parents?
To answer this question consider again the case (n;w) = n(a + dw) as in the BB model. Recall
that in the unconstrained case positive consumption requires (1 + r) (a + dw) > w + y meaning
that children are a nancial burden. In the constrained case instead, equation (11) implies c =
w+ y  (a+ dw)n > 0: Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for children to be a net nancial benet is
n > (1 + r) which requires a relatively low interest rate. Such condition can be satised because
r is not a determinant of n. More generally, for any function (n;w) and (n) = (n) =(1 + n)
it can be shown that a necessary condition for children to be a net nancial benet is
n >
 
1  Uc (c)

Uc (c
)
(1 + r);
which is an easier condition to satisfy as long as Uc (c
) is not much lower than one.
It is convenient to rewrite (10) as:
c = Uc (c
)n(n;w)
1  (n)
0(n)
: (12)
Equations (11) and (12) can be used to obtain a graphical solution for c and n. Equation (11)
provides a negative relationship between consumption and fertility, while (12) provides a positive
relationship, as long as Uc (c
) does not decrease too strongly with consumption, i.e., @Uc (c)=@c >
 1: Figure 1 illustrates the determination of c and n for the BB functional forms.13 It is easy
to check graphically that @c=@y > 0; @c=@w > 0; @n=@y > 0 while @n=@w is undetermined.
Remember that in the frictionless case @c=@y < 0; and @n=@y = @n=@w = 0 while @c=@w < 0
if (1 + r)d < 1 or @c=@w > 0 otherwise. The constrained version provides more standard and
plausible comparative statics. In particular, it predicts a positive response of consumption to both
labor and non-labor income which overcomes one limitation of the frictionless version. Regarding
the response of fertility to non-labor income, children are normal goods in both the constrained
and unconstrained models, but in the unconstrained model higher y for all generations translates
into more children only for the initial generation while in the constrained version fertility increase
for all generations.
It is interesting to notice the similarity between equation (10) and the determinants of fertility
13The gure assumes w+y (N ;w) > 0 and N such that 0(n)=(1 (n)) is decreasing. As mentioned before,
if N is too large problems may arise becuase either (N) may be larger than 1 or 0(n)=(1   (n)) may start
increasing. Moreover, if w + y   (N ;w) < 0 then one can redene N , the maximum number of children, as the one
that satises w + y   (N ;w) = 0:
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in non-altruistic models. For instance, in Greenwood and Seshadri (2002, p. 156) fertility is
determined by equalizing marginal costs and marginal benets of children. Marginal costs include
the opportunity wage cost of children, and the benets are a function of the future wage of the
child. This stands in sharp contrast with the unconstrained allocation of the BB model, where
fertility is not determined from such comparison of costs and benets of children. Although there
is a connection between the determinants of fertility in the constrained allocation of our altruistic
model and those in a non-altruistic model, there is an important distinction between the two. As
in the BB model, our model endogenizes the value of the children to the parent, while this value is
ad hoc in non-altruistic models.
Consider now the sign of @n=@w in the constrained model. According to equation (10), the
marginal benet of children increases with wages because higher wages increase the welfare of
o¤springs making children more valuable for altruistic parents. This e¤ect alone would imply a
positive fertility-income relationship, contrary to the data. To obtain a negative relationship the
marginal cost of children must not only increase with wages, but increase more than the marginal
benet. Whether the marginal cost of children increase with wages or not depends on the result of
two opposite e¤ects. On the one hand, the marginal cost increases with w because nw(n;w) > 0 as
this term captures the larger opportunity cost of parentstime invested in children. On the other
hand, the marginal utility of consumption U 0(c) falls because consumption increase with wages.
Therefore, the marginal cost of children increase with wages only if the rst e¤ect dominates the
second, which ultimately limits the curvature of the utility function.
Equation (10) can be written using elasticities and expressing the marginal cost and benet in
terms of the level of U as follows
Uc (c
)n(n
; w)
(n;w)
w + y   (n;w) = 

n (n
)
(n)
1  (n) : (13)
Equation (13) is useful because w and y only a¤ect the left hand side of the equation, the relative
marginal cost, but not the right hand side, the relative marginal benet. Moreover, given that
the relative marginal benet is decreasing in n, due to Assumption 1, a negative fertility wage
relationship occurs when the relative marginal cost increases with wages. The following two propo-
sitions characterize the relationship between fertility and wages implied by equation (13) for CRRA
preferences U(c) = c
1 
1  +A: The constant A > 0 allows to consider values of  larger than 1.
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The rst proposition states that high wage individuals choose maximum fertility if the elasticity
of substitution is less than one; otherwise, they may choose less than the maximum.
Proposition 1. Let U(c) = c
1 
1  +A  0 where   0 and suppose limw!1 (n;w)=w = (n) >
0: Then, limw!1 n(w)! N if  > 1 and limw!1 n(w)! en if  < 1 where en solves the
14A > 0 is needed when  > 1 for utility to be positive. Otherwise the utility ow, c
1 
t
1  ; would be negative when
 > 1, and parent would have no children to avoid adding negative utility ows to their own utility. Furthermore,
when  > 1 consumption has to be above [(   1)A] 11  to guarantee U(c)  0. Notice that A corresponds to the
maximum utility ow when  > 1. The minimum utility ow of zero. These issues do not emerge when 0 <  < 1,
and A can be set to zero.
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equation:
(1  ) n(en) (en)1  (en) = n (en) (en)1  (en) : (14)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The following is the intuition behind Proposition 1. When  > 1 the marginal value of income
U 0(c) = c  falls at a faster rate as w !1 than the rate at which the opportunity cost of raising
children increases. As a result, the marginal cost of raising children decreases toward zero while
the marginal benet remains bounded above zero making maximum fertility optimal. A similar
result is obtained by Hall and Jones (2007) in the context of longevity rather than fertility. They
use a similar specication to show that when  > 1, longevity is a superior good because the
marginal utility of consumption falls with income, while the marginal utility of longevity does not.
Although such feature of preferences is convenient in the case of longevity and health spending, it is
problematic in context of fertility because it also implies that fertility should increase with wages.
When  2 (0; 1), fertility approaches a value dened by (14). For the BB formulation, expression
(14) becomes (1 )d1 den = en 11 en : This equation has a well-dened solution if d is large enough and/or
 is low.15 If the altruistic function (n) =  (1  e n) is used instead, the equation becomes
(1 )d
1 den = (1 )een+ which has a unique solution if (1  ) d < : In both cases, fertility for high
wage individuals depends negatively on the time cost of raising children, d, and positively on the
degree of altruism, :
At rst glance Proposition 1 is a negative result because an elasticity below one, or  > 1; is the
common value used in most applied work in macro.16 However, for fertility choices such elasticity
entails the counterfactual implication that the most productive individuals would have the highest
fertility. Intuitively, this is because a low elasticity of substitution increases the value providing pos-
itive consumption to all possible descendants as wages increase. In contrast, if the elasticity is larger
than 1 then high parental consumption can substitute for low or zero consumption of descendants.
However, this intuition also reveals that the key parameter is not the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, which controls intra-personal consumption smoothing, but the intergenerational elas-
ticity of substitution, which controls inter-personal consumption smoothing. In separable models,
such as the ones in this paper, both elasticities are equal to 1=: In a companion paper, Cordoba
and Ripoll (2011a) show that if these two elasticities are disentangled using non-separable models,
then the negative result above does not hold: the most productive individuals do not need to have
the highest fertility even if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is low. In the context of sep-
arable models as the current one, the practical implication is that when analyzing fertility choices
it is better to interpret 1= as the intergenerational rather than as the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.
The following Lemma provides a necessary and su¢ cient condition for fertility to decrease with
15An interior solution may not exist as corner solutions are possible. Besides, as mentioned above, the BB altruistic
function does not satisfy Assumption 1 nor (n) < 1 for all n. As a result, there may be multiple solutions or no
solutions to equation (14) for that formulation.
16See discussion in Jones, Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2008).
12
wages for all wage levels.
Lemma 2. Let U(c) = c
1 
1  +A  0 where   0: Then @n@w < 0 if and only if

n
w (n
;w)

1 +
y
w

+
 
	(c)w (n
;w)  nw (n;w)
  (n;w)
w
> 	(c) (15)
where 	(c) =  + Uc (c): For the case when 

n (n;w) = n for all (n;w) condition (15)
simplies to:
w (n
;w)

1 +
y
w

+ (	(c)  1)  (n
;w)
w

> 	(c): (16)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The following proposition uses Lemma 2 to typify two polar cases in which fertility decreases
with wages. While in both cases  2 (0; 1) is needed, the rst case also requires strictly positive
non-labor income while the second requires non-homothetic preferences.
Proposition 3. Let n (n;w) = n. Then fertility decreases with wages in the following cases:
(i) non-labor income case: A = 0; 0 <  < 1 and "w (n;w) (1 + y=w) > 1;
(ii) non-homothetic preferences: (n;w) = (n)w; y = 0; A > 0 and 0 <  < 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Notice that since "w  1, the rst part of Proposition 3 requires the share of labor income over
total income, w= (w + y), to be below "w to obtain a negative fertility-income relationship. If labor
is the only input in the production of children then "w = 1, the condition is satised for all wages,
and @n=@w ! 0 as w !1: A similar result can be obtained even if "w is not constant but "w ! 1
as w !1: This occurs, for example, when  is a CES function with low elasticity of substitution.
The second part of Proposition 3 assumes "w = 1; lets y = 0 but set A > 0. The non-homotheticity
in the utility function generates a relative marginal benet of children that is decreasing with w.
The cases highlighted in Proposition 3 hint at the importance of the presence of either non-labor
income or non-homothetic utility in order to generate a negative fertility-income relationship under
the constrained allocation. Although this is indeed the case here, we have veried in ongoing work
that the presence of non-labor income or non-homothetic utility are not required in generalizations
of the constrained model to settings with uncertainty. In those settings, what is essential to obtain
the negative fertility-income relationship is the credit friction.
The analysis in this section reveals that the constrained model can overcome three key shortcom-
ings of the unconstrained model. In the constrained allocation fertility can decrease with wages,
consumption is increasing in labor and non-labor income, and children do not need to be a net
nancial burden to parents.
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3 A life cycle model of fertility and the quantity-quality trade-o¤
This section extends the benchmark model by incorporating life cycle features, human capital
accumulation, and alternative sources of nancial frictions. We study the ability of the extended
model to predict a negative fertility-wage relationship. We consider two types of nancial frictions:
non-negative bequests and borrowing constraints for students. We show that key results of the
previous section hold. In particular, absent nancial frictions, fertility and income are unrelated,
but if nancial frictions are binding, a negative relationship between fertility and wages can be
obtained. As in the benchmark, this is the case if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is larger than one and preferences, or technologies, are non-homothetic. The result is obtained
even when bequests are positive but individuals are constrained during their schooling years. We
also study the ability of the model to generate the so called quantity-quality trade-o¤: a negative
association between fertility and schooling years which is typically observed in cross-country data
as well as across individuals within a country. We show that the model can generate such pattern:
as wages increase, fertility decreases and schooling increases.
3.1 Individuals problem
Individuals live for T periods, go to school from age 0 to age s, work from age s to age T , and have
n children at age F: They choose a life-cycle consumption prole C = [c0; cT ], number of children
n 2 [0; N ]; schooling years s 2 [0; F ], and transfers to each child b0  0; in order to maximize their
life-time utility. Lifetime resources are composed of non-negative parental transfers b, non-labor
income [y0; yT ], and lifetime labor income wH(s); where w is the wage rate per unit of human
capital and H(s) is life-time human capital. H(s) depends positively on years schooling. The
lifetime cost of having children is given by (n; s;w).17 Finally, we assume that children are unable
to borrow during schooling years. This has the natural and plausible implication that parental
transfers are the only source of income during the rst s years.18
The following is the recursive formulation of the individuals problem:
V (b) = max
C=[c0;cT ];a0;b00;n2[0;N ];0sF
U(C) + (n)V
 
b0

17The main results presented below only depend on the general properties of H(s) and (n; s;w). They could
be dened more precisely as H(s) =
R T
0
e rtht(s)dt and (n; s;w) =
R T
0
e rtt(n; s;w)dt where ht(s) is the human
capital at age t and t(n; s;w) is the cost of children at age t.
18Notice that in this model individuals decide their own schooling and consumption. They are linked to parents
only through the transfers they give them at birth. In Cordoba and Ripoll (2011b) we show that this simpler model
yields almost identical steady state predictions to one in which children live with the parent during schooling years,
become independent upon nishing school and receive a non-negative transfer from the parent upon independence.
The latter is a more complicated model with additional state variables. In the analysis that follows, parental transfers
to children are the channel by which the quality-quantity trade-o¤ takes place.
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subject to:
b+
sZ
0
e rtytdt =
sZ
0
e rtctdt+ e rsa; and
e rsa+ e rswH(s) +
TZ
s
e rtytdt =
TZ
s
e rtctdt+ e rs(n; s;w) + ne rF b0;
In this representation V (b) is the lifetime welfare of the individual, and U(C) is an utility index,
or composite good, associated to the consumption prole C = [c0; cT ]: The function (n)  0 is
the weight that parents place on the welfare of their n children, which is assumed to have the
same properties as before and to satisfy Assumption 1. The constraints of the problem are the
two budget constraints: one for the rst s year of life and one for the remaining years, both in
present value at age 0. Individuals can also choose the amount of assets at age s, a. The two
nancial frictions imbedded in the problem are the non-negativity of lifetime parental transfers to
their children, b0  0; and the non-negativity of assets at the end of schooling years, a  0: We call
these constraints the bequest and borrowing constraints respectively. Let Y (s)  R Ts e r(t s)ytdt
and I(n; s;w)  wH(s) + Y (s)   (n; s;w) be the present value at age s of non-labor and total
income net of child costs after age s respectively.
We focus on the CRRA utility function
U(C) =
TZ
0
e t
c1 t
1  dt+A;
where  is the parents subjective discount rate, and 1= is the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution. The constant A > 0 allows to consider values of  larger than 1.
The solution of this model is summarized in Appendix C. In what follows, we present the main
steady state insights regarding fertility and schooling. The following proposition considers fertility
for the case in which nancial constraints are not binding.
Proposition 4. Suppose the non-negative bequest constraint b0  0 does not bind. Then steady
state optimal fertility n is given by the solution to the equation
(n)
n
= e rF
Proof. See Appendix C.
The key message of Proposition 4 is that in a frictionless dynamic altruistic model with en-
dogenous fertility and schooling, steady state fertility is determined by the interest rate. Thus,
the main insight from the basic model still holds. As discussed in the previous section, this stems
from the fact that with no nancial constraints fertility is determined from the bequest optimality
15
condition, rather than from the fertility optimality condition.
We now study the predictions under nancial frictions. The analysis below proceeds in two
steps. First, we assume H(0) > 0 and Hs(s) = 0 in order to abstract from schooling choices. In
this case it is optimal to choose s = 0 and b = a  0 so that borrowing constraints are not binding
but the bequest constraint may bind. A su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition for the bequest
constraint to bind is given by Assumption 4 below, a condition analogous to Assumption 1. We show
that the model can be reduced to a model analogous to that of Section 2 and therefore Proposition
1 and 3 as well as Lemma 2 still apply. In a second step we consider the case H(0) = 0 and Hs > 0:
In this case the bequest constraint is not binding because otherwise childrens consumption would
be zero. On the other hand, the borrowing constraint may bind. We show that Assumption 2
provides a su¢ cient condition for the borrowing constraint to bind. Given the added complication
of choosing schooling years, s, the analytical characterization is more di¢ cult. However, we conrm
through numerical simulations that the results of the simpler model still hold. We also show that
the model can produce a quantity-quality trade-o¤: as wages increase, fertility falls but schooling
years increase.
3.2 Case 1: exogenous human capital
Suppose H(0) > 0 and Hs(s) = 0. In this case it is optimal to pick s = 0 and b = a  0. Let
H  H(0) be human capital. The individuals problem can then be written as:
V (b) = max
n2[0;N ];b00;C=[c0;cT ]
U(C) + (n)V (b0)
subject to
b+ I(n;w) =
TZ
0
e rtctdt+ ne rF b0:
We are interested in cases when the bequest constraint binds. The following assumption, analo-
gous to Assumption 2, guarantees that the bequest constraint binds in the steady state. As before,
let (n)  (n)=n denotes the average level of altruism.
Assumption 4. limn!0 (n)erF  1.
To gain some intuition on Assumption 4, suppose that (0) = e F so that a parent with
no children discounts the utility of his rst dn children only by the date of their birth using the
parents own time discount rate, . In this case Assumption 4 becomes e ( r)F  1 or r   which
is a standard assumption for bequest constraints to bind. This is because if the interest rate is
below the rate of time preference, parents would like to borrow rather than save or leave bequests.
Assumption 4 provides a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for the bequest to bind.
Proposition 5. Let Assumption 4 hold. Then the bequest constraint binds in steady state.
Proof. See Appendix D.
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Optimal fertility Given Assumption 4, optimal fertility can be derived focusing on the steady
state situation b = b0 = 0. It is convenient to solve the problem in two steps: rst, nd the optimal
consumption path given n, and second, solve for n. In absence of bequests and for given n, the
optimal consumption plan solves the subproblem:
U (I (n;w)) = max
C=[c0;cT ]
TZ
0
e t
c1 t
1  dt+A subject to I(n;w) 
TZ
0
e rtctdt:
The optimality condition is given by the standard equation ct = c0e
r 

t and therefore I(n;w) =
c0
1 e(
r 
  r)T
r (r )= . Moreover,
U(I(n;w)) =

1  I(n;w)
1  +A; (20)
where  =

1 e (r (r )=)T
r (r )=

> 0: Notice that @U=@I = I  > 0, which implies that the
marginal utility of income is decreasing at a rate that depends on . Thus, the higher the , or
the lower the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the lower the utility value of each additional
dollar. Once U (I (n;w)) is solved for then the parental problem can be recasted as one of choosing
only the number of children:
V (b) = max
n2[0;N ]
U (I (n;w)) + (n)V (b0): (21)
Assuming an interior solution, the optimality condition for fertility is given by

 @I(n;w)
@n

 @U
 (I (n;w))
@I
= 0(n)V (b0): (22)
The left-hand side of equation (22) is the marginal cost and the right-hand side is the marginal
benet of children both measured in personal utils (or composite good). Consider the e¤ects of
wages on the marginal benets and costs. The marginal benet of children increases with wages
because it increases the utility that children enjoy which also increase the utility that altruistic
parents derive from children. This e¤ect alone would imply a positive fertility-wage relationship,
contrary to the data. To obtain a negative relationship the marginal cost of children must not
only increase with wages but increases more than the marginal benet. Whether the marginal
cost of children increases with wages depends on the result of two opposite e¤ects. On one hand,
the marginal cost increases with w because the opportunity cost of forgone labor income by the
parents increases. That is,  (@I(n;w)=@n) increases with w for any given number of children. On
the other hand, the marginal utility of income, @U (I (n;w)) =@I may decrease with wages. In a
well-behaved model the rst e¤ect should dominate the second e¤ect so that the marginal cost of
children increases with wages. As we conrm next, this requires  > 1.
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Along a steady state equation (22) can be written, using (21) and the denition of I(n;w), as:
n(n;w)I(n)
  =
0(n)
1  (n)U
 (I (n)) :
Finally, using (20), this equation can be written in a way analogous to (13):
U

I (n
;w) n (n
;w)
(n; w)
wH + Y   (n; w) = 

n (n
)
(n)
1  (n) : (23)
Since (13) and (23) are qualitatively the same, it is easy to check that Propositions 1 and 3 and
Lemma 2 still apply.
3.3 Case 2: endogenous human capital
We now consider the case of endogenous schooling. In particular, suppose now that H(0) = 0 and
Hs(s) > 0: Given these assumptions and the Inada condition for utility, it is optimal for parents
to leave positive bequests. Otherwise childrens consumption would be zero for a positive time
interval, which is suboptimal. Furthermore, optimal schooling is now positive. The model with
endogenous human capital adds two complications to the analysis as optimal bequest and schooling
need to be endogenously determined in addition to fertility. To simplify the analysis, it is convenient
to assume r = , T = 1 and Y = 0: It is also convenient to postulate specic functional forms.
In particular, suppose (n) = n1+n and (n; s;w) = wH(s) (1  f(n)) where f(n) is a function
satisfying f(0) = 1 and f 0(n) < 0. This formulation of the cost of children (n; s;w) implies
that labor costs are the main costs. As a result of this formulation, lifetime income is given by
I(n; s;w) = wf(n)H(s) where f(n) is the e¤ective lifetime labor supply of parents, a decreasing
function of the number of children.
It is straightforward to show that if r =  then ct = cS for t  s and ct = cW for t  s. In the
absence of borrowing constraints it would be optimal to perfectly smooth consumption by setting
cS = cW . This is not the case under Assumption 4, as the following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 6. Let Assumption 4 hold. Then the borrowing constraint binds in steady state.
Proof. See Appendix D.
We assume that Assumption 4 holds in the remainder of this section. As shown in Appendix
C, the rst order condition with respect to fertility is given by:
  e rsIn(n; s;w) + e rF b0u0  cW  = 0(n)V  b0
This condition is similar to (22) but now both s and b0 are not zero and need to be determined.
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Appendix C shows that fertility and schooling are jointly determined by the following two equations:
 f
0(n)
f(n)
=
 (s; n)(n)=r
1  
h 
(n)erF
(1 )=
(ers   1) + 1
i
+ ( (s; n)) (I(n; s;w)) 1 (n)ersA;
(24)
H 0(s)
H(s)
= r +

1  

1  ((n)erF )(1 )=

 (s; n) ; (25)
where
 (s; n)  c
W
I(n; s;w)
=
r
1 + ne rF ((n)erF )1= (ers   1)
:
Consider rst the fertility decision. The left-hand-side of equation (24) is the marginal cost
of children as a fraction of lifetime labor. The right-hand-side is the relative marginal benet of
children. First notice that if A = 0 then income I(n; s;w) is not a determinant of fertility, nor of
schooling. Next, if A > 0 and  2 (0; 1) then the relative marginal benet of children falls with
income as in the previous sections. Consider now the quantity-quality trade-o¤between fertility and
schooling implied by equation (24). First, since schooling increases lifetime income, then fertility is a
negative function of schooling through this channel when A > 0 and  2 (0; 1). The second key term
involved in the quantity-quality trade-o¤ is  (s; n) ; the fraction of lifetime income consumed by
parents. Notice that s (s; n) < 0 which means that schooling further reduces the marginal benet
of children through this channel. To understand why, notice that 1 + ne rF
 
(n)erF
1=
(ers   1)
is the "e¤ective" life span of a parent. Absent children, this e¤ective life span is 1: Term (ers   1)
is the life span of a child while at school. The longer children stay at school, the longer the parent
needs to nance their consumption which explains why  (s; n) falls with s.
Consider now the schooling decision. The left-hand-side of equation (25) represents the returns
to schooling measured as the rate at which lifetime income increases with additional schooling; the
right-hand-side is the opportunity cost of schooling. To better understand this equation, suppose
for a moment that (n)erF = 1 which means that credit frictions are not binding. In that case the
opportunity cost of schooling is just the rate of returns to savings. If credit frictions are binding,
(n)erF < 1; the opportunity cost of schooling is larger because the implicit shadow price of credit
is larger (see Cordoba and Ripoll (2011b) for more discussion).
Whether the opportunity cost of schooling increases or decreases with fertility depends on two
potentially o¤setting e¤ects. On the one hand, higher fertility increases the shadow price of credit
through the term  (1  ) 1  1  ((n)erF )(1 )= which is associated to the consumption jump
that occurs at time individuals become workers. On the other hand, term  (s; n) typically decreases
with the number of children, although the sign of n (s; n) is not fully determined, because parents
need to reduce their consumption to nance schooling for a larger number of children. In the
simulations below we nd that the rst e¤ect always dominates the second e¤ect because the main
component of the e¤ective life span of the parent is the life span of the parent, 1, rather than the
life span associated to their children, ne rF (s)(n)1= (ers   1) :
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Numerical simulation Although a fully calibrated version of the model is beyond the scope
of this paper, here we provide a numerical simulation to illustrate the ability of the model to
replicate the quality-quantity trade-o¤. The functional forms assumed are H(s) = s ; f(n) =
1+  (n+) and (n) = n1+n : The following are the parameter values used: r = 3%, F = 30;
 = 0:25,  = 0:40,  = 0:8;  = 0:225;  = 230 and  = 140: This parametrization implies lifetime
labor supplies associated to having 0, 0:5 and 1 child of 1, 0:79 and 0:61 respectively. Keep in mind
that 0:5 children per parent means a child per couple. Moreover, the degree of altruism implied is
(0) = 0, (0:5) = 0:16 and (1) = 0:28 which implicitly includes time discounting due to the fact
that children are born at age 30. Finally, the implied returns to schooling at age 16 are 5%.
Figure 2 shows the predictions of the model for schooling and fertility for di¤erent wage levels.
The relevant scale of the model is A=w1 . For su¢ ciently high wages this scale is zero so that
fertility and schooling are independent of wages. In the gure, schooling for high wage, or high
ability, individuals is close to 23 years while fertility is close to 0.5 children. For low wage individuals,
schooling is close to 19.5 year while fertility is just below 3.5 children. This simulation conrms
that the model can generate the following results: (i) fertility decreases with wages; (ii) schooling
increases with wages; (iii) a quantity-quality trade-o¤ as fertility decreases as schooling increases.
We can also check if children are a net benet or cost to society in the sense that the present value
of their earnings are larger than the present value of their costs. The marginal cost of a child for a
parent (when the parent is age 0) is e rsn(n; s;w) =  e rswH(s)f 0(n): Since the child is born at
time F and starts working at age s, the present value of the child earnings (when the parent is age-0)
is e r(F+s)wH(s): Therefore, the net benet to society of a newborn is e rswH(s)
 
e rF + f 0(n)

.
This surplus is positive if e rF >  f 0(n), which holds for this numerical simulation for all wages
as shown in Figure 3.
4 Concluding comments
The Barro-Becker model is important because it ultimately corresponds to the neoclassical growth
model with endogenous fertility. However, endogenizing fertility within this framework turns out to
generate predictions that overturn some of the most appealing implications of neoclassical growth
such as the existence of a unique steady state, the dependence of consumption growth on the interest
rate and the rate of time preference, or the positive relationship between consumption and income.
We have shown that introducing credit frictions into the Barro-Becker model helps restoring some
of the appealing predictions of the neoclassical model as well as providing new plausible predictions
for fertility and schooling.
Regarding fertility choices, the BB model predicts that fertility depends mainly on the interest
rate and on the degree of altruism, but it is independent of income. One of the implications of
this theory is that if we were to explain the cross-sectional distribution of fertility within the same
country, one would have to attribute it to either di¤erences in altruism across parents, or to di¤erent
interest rates parents face. None of these explanations seems appealing. We show that introducing
credit frictions in the BB model makes income a determinant of fertility. This implies that within
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the same country, parents with di¤erent levels of income would choose di¤erent fertility rates. In
fact, using micro US data, Jones and Tertilt (2006) estimate an income elasticity of fertility of
about  0:38.
This paper has focused on explaining the pervasive negative fertility-income relationship appar-
ent in the data. Hazan and Zoabi (2012) have recently provided some evidence that this relationship
may actually be non-monotonic, generally decreasing with wages but slightly increasing for highly
educated workers. Models in this paper could explain that pattern. Consider for example Proposi-
tion 2 with "w < 1 and y > 0. For relatively low wages "

w (1 + y=w) > 1 is satised which implies
that fertility decreases with wages. However, for su¢ ciently high wages "w (1 + y=w) < 1 which
implies that fertility increases with wages.
One of the most interesting ndings here is that even though income becomes a determinant
of fertility in the presence of credit frictions, obtaining the negative fertility-income relationship
is challenging, specially if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low, as it is standard
in quantitative macro. In a companion paper, Cordoba and Ripoll (2011a), we explore other
types of preferences that may help generate a fertility-income relationship consistent with the data
without making assumptions on parameters that run contrary to other evidence used in quantitative
macroeconomics.
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A Solution of benchmark model
The individualsproblem for t  0 is:
Vt(bt) = max
bt+10; Nnt0
U(It(nt;wt; yt) + (1 + rt) bt   ntbt+1) + (nt)Vt+1(bt+1); (26)
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where It(nt;wt; yt)  wt+yt  (nt;wt) : Optimality conditions for the bequest and fertility choices
are:
U 0(ct)  U 0(ct+1) (1 + rt+1) (nt)=nt; (27)
and
U 0(ct) (bt+1 + n(nt;wt)) = 
0(nt)Vt+1(bt+1); (28)
where
ct = wt + yt + (1 + rt) bt    (nt; wt)  ntbt+1: (29)
Unconstrained solution Equation (27) can be written as
Uc (ct)
U(ct)
ct
= Uc (ct+1)
U(ct+1)
ct+1
(1 + rt+1)
(nt)
nt
: (30)
In this steady state this equation becomes
1 = (1 + r)
(n)
n
:
On the other hand, using (30) and (29), equation (28) can be written as:
(nt)Vt+1(bt+1) = (ntbt+1 + ntn(nt;wt))
Uc (ct)
n (nt)
U(ct)
ct
(31)
= (wt + yt + (1 + rt) bt    (nt;wt) + ntn(nt;wt)  ct)
Uc (ct)
n (nt)
U(ct)
ct
= (wt + yt + (1 + rt) bt +  (nt;wt) (

n(nt;wt)  1)  ct)
Uc (ct)
n (nt)
U(ct)
ct
:
Lagging (31) one period and using (30) results in:
Vt(bt) =
nt 1 (bt + n(nt 1;wt 1))
(nt 1)
1
n (nt 1)
Uc (ct 1)U(ct 1)
ct 1
(32)
=
nt 1 (bt + n(nt 1;wt 1))
(nt 1)
Uc (ct)
n (nt 1)
U(ct)
ct
(1 + rt)
(nt 1)
nt 1
= (1 + rt) (bt + n(nt 1;wt 1))
Uc (ct)
n (nt 1)
U(ct)
ct
:
Substituting (31) and (32) into (26) yields:
(1 + rt) (bt + n(nt 1;wt 1))
Uc (ct)
n (nt 1)
U(ct)
ct
= U(ct) + (wt + yt + (1 + rt) bt +  (nt;wt) (

n(nt;wt)  1)  ct)
Uc (ct)
n (nt)
U(ct)
ct
;
or
(1 + rt) (bt + n(nt 1;wt 1))
Uc (ct)
n (nt 1)
=

n (nt)  Uc (ct)
n (nt)

ct + (wt + yt + (1 + rt) bt +  (nt;wt) (

n(nt;wt)  1))
Uc (ct)
n (nt)
:
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Finally, collecting terms we obtain:
ct =
Uc (ct)
n (nt)  Uc (ct)
 (33)
(1 + rt) (bt + n(nt 1;wt 1))
n (nt)
n (nt 1)
  (wt + yt + (1 + rt) bt +  (nt;wt) (n(nt;wt)  1))

:
This provides the solution for consumption. A simplication arises when functions U and  are
isoelastic, as in BB. In this case the previous equation becomes:
ct =

    [(1 + rt)n(nt 1;wt 1)  (wt + yt +  (nt;wt) (

n(nt;wt)  1))] :
BB further assume  (nt;wt) =  (wt)nt, so that 

n(nt) = 1; and y = 0 which further simplies the
previous equation to:
ct =

    [(1 + rt)(wt 1)  wt] :
In the steady state equation (33) becomes:
c =
Uc (c)
n (n)  Uc (c)
[(1 + r)n(n;w) +  (n;w) (1  n(n))  w   y] ;
which corresponds to equation (8) in the text. Next, the budget constraint in steady state reads:
(1 + r   n) b = c  (w + y    (n;w)) = c  I(n;w; y):
Plugging in steady state consumption and simplifying:
(1 + r   n)  n (n)  Uc (c) b = Uc (c) [(1 + r)n(n;w)  n(n;w) (n;w)]  I (n;w; y) n (n);
and since (1 + r   n)  n (n)  Uc (c) > 0, then a necessary and su¢ cient condition for b  0 is,
using (27) in steady state:
Uc (c) [(1 + r)n(n;w)  n(n;w) (n;w)]
= Uc (c)

n(n;w)(n;w)

1 + r
n
  1

= Uc (c)

n(n;w)(n;w)

1  (n)
(n)

> I (n;w; y) n (n) = (w + y   (n;w)) n (n);
or
Uc (c)

n(n;w)
n (n)
1  (n)
(n)
>
w + y   (n;w)
(n;w)
which provides the basis for Assumption 2 in the text.
Constrained solution The following equations describe the constrained solution:
Vt = U(ct) + (nt)Vt+1;
ct = wt + yt    (nt;wt) ;
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U 0(wt + yt    (nt;wt))n(nt;wt) = 0(nt)Vt+1;
where the last equation can be written as:
Uc (ct)

n(nt;wt)
U(ct)
ct
(nt;wt)
nt
= n (nt)
(nt)
nt
Vt+1:
In the steady state this equation reads:
Uc (c
)n(n
;w)
U(c)
c
(n;w) = n (n
)
(n)
1  (n)U(c
);
Uc (c
)n(n
;w)
(n;w)
c
= n (n
)
(n)
1  (n) ;
Uc (c
)n(n
;w)
(n;w)
w + y   (n;w) = 

n (n
)
(n)
1  (n) ;
which corresponds to equation (13) in the text.
B Proofs - section 2
This appendix includes the proofs of all propositions and lemmas for the benchmark model (section
2).
Proof of Proposition 1 Suppose w ! 1: From equation (11) it follows that c ! 1 since
n  N: Furthermore, notice that Uc (c) = 11
1 +Ac
 1 > 0: Consider rst the case  > 1: In
that case, limw!1 Uc (c) = 0: Thus, the limit of the relative marginal cost, in equation (13), is
zero while the relative marginal benet is positive for any n  N: As a result, maximum fertility,
n = N; is optimal. For the case  < 1; limw!1 Uc (c) = 1   and equation (13) can be written
as (14).
Proof of Lemma 2 First, write (10) as
lnn(n;w)   ln c  ln

1
1  c
1  +A

= ln0(n)  ln (1  (n)) :
Totally di¤erentiating this equation around the steady state one obtains
nw(n;w)dw + nn(n;w)dn
n(n;w)
  dc
c
  c
 dc
1
1  c1  +A
=
"
0
dn+
0
1  dn;
or
nw(n;w)dw
n(n;w)
 	dc=c =

"
0
+
0
1    
nn(n;w)
n(n;w)

dn;
where
	(c) =  +
c1 
1
1  c1  +A
=  + Uc (c) > 0:
Since (11) implies dc =  n(n;w)dn+(1  w(n;w)) dw; then the previous equation can be written
as 
nw(n;w)
n(n;w)
  	
c
(1  w(n;w))

dw =

"
0
+
0
1    
nn(n;w)
n(n;w)
  n(n;w)
	
c

dn:
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Next, notice from (10) that
0(n)
1  (n) =
n(n;w)
c
(	  ) ;
and thus
dn
dw
=
 nw(n;w)n(n;w) +
	
c (1  w(n;w))
 "0 +  n(n;w)c + nn(n;w)n(n;w)
:
Since by assumption nn(n;w) > 0, then the denominator is always positive, then dn=dw < 0 if
and only if  nw(n;w)n(n;w) +
	
c (1  w(n;w)) < 0, or (w + y   ) 
n
w > 	(w   w) :19 This expression
can be written as

n
w (n
;w)

1 +
y
w

+
 
	(c)w (n
;w)  nw (n;w)
  (n;w)
w
> 	(c);
which corresponds to (15) in the Lemma. In addition, when n (n;w) = n then w (n;w) =

n
w (n;w) : To see this, notice that in this case n(n;w) = 

n(n;w)=n for all (n;w): Therefore,
nw(n;w) = 

n
w(n
;w)
n and

n
w (n
;w) = nw (n
;w)
w
n (n
;w)
= n (n
;w)
w (n
;w)
n
w
n (n
;w)
= nw (n
;w)
w
 (n;w)
 (n;w) =n
n (n
;w)
= n (n
;w) w (n
;w)
 (n;w) =n
n (n
;w)
= n (n
;w) w (n
;w)
1
n (n;w)
= w:
Making w (n;w) = 
n
w (n;w) in (15) results in (16).
Proof of Proposition 3 (i) In this case	(c) = 1 and equation (16) simplies to "w (n;w) (1 + y=w) >
1; (ii) If 0 <  < 1 and A > 0 then 	(c) < 	(1) = 1: In addition, equation (16) can be written
as (1 	(c)) (1   (n) =w) > 0 which is satised because both factors are positive.
C Solution of model with fertility and schooling
Consider the individuals problem in the text:
V (b) = max
C=[c0;cT ];a0;b00;n2[0;N ];0sF
U(C) + (n)V
 
b0

;
subject to
b+
Z s
0
e rtytdt =
Z s
0
e rtctdt+ e rsa; (34a)
e rsa+ e rsI(n; s;w) =
Z T
s
e rtctdt+ ne rF b0; (35a)
where I(n; s;w)  wH(s) +
Z T
s
e r(t s)ytdt  (n; s;w):
19Notice that nn(n;w) > 0 is su¢ cient but not necessary for the result. We could have nn(n;w) < 0 as long as
it is small in absolute value.
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C.1 General solution
The Lagrangian associated to the problem above is given by:
L =
Z s
0
e tu (ct) dt+
Z T
s
e tu(ct)dt+A+(n)V
 
b0

+ 1

b+
Z s
0
e rtytdt 
Z s
0
e rtctdt  e rsa

+2

e rsa+ e rsI(n; s;w) 
Z T
s
e rtctdt  ne rF b0

+ 3a+ 4b
0;
and the rst order necessary conditions with respect to ct; s; n, b0 and a are respectively:
e tu0 (ct) = 1e rt for t  s
e tu0 (ct) = 2e rt for t > s
;
 use s   1
 re rsa  e rsys + cSs e rs
+2
 re rs (a+ I(n; s;w)) + e rsIs(n; s;w) + cWs e rs = 0;
0(n)V
 
b0

= 2

e rF b0   e rsIn(n; s;w)

;
(n)V 0
 
b0

+ 4 = 2e
 rFn; (36)
and
e rs (1   2) = 3;
where
us  u
 
cWs
  u  cSs  ;
cWs denotes the consumption at age s as worker, and c
S
s the consumption at age s as student. If
the borrowing constraint between ages 0 and s binds, so that a = 0 and 3 > 0; then 1 6= 2 and
cWs 6= cSs . If the borrowing constraint does not bind, then cWs = cSs and us = 0, so there is perfect
consumption smoothing. In addition to the optimality conditions above, notice that the following
envelope condition holds:
V 0 (b) = 1: (37)
C.2 Special case with r = 
As in section 3.3., consider the special case in which r =  and yt = 0 for all t. In this case the
individual problem can be written as
V (b) = max
n2[0;N ];cS ;cW ;b00;s2[0;F ]
u
 
cS
 1  e rs
r
+ u
 
cW
 e rs   e rT
r
+A+(n)V
 
b0

;
subject to
b = cS
 
1  e rs =r;
e rsI(n; s;w) = cW
 
e rs   e rT  =r + ne rF b0;
where I(n; s;w)  wH(s) (n; s;w): Recall that (n; s;w) = wH(s) (1  f(n)) so that I(n; s;w) =
wH(s)f(n). As discussed in section 3.3, in this case it is optimal for parents to give a positive
bequest, as otherwise students consumption would be zero while at school. It would also be the
case that a = 0. Let 1 and 2 be the multipliers on the two budget constraints.
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Consumption and bequests The rst-order necessary conditions with respect to cS ; cW and
b0 and the envelope condition are:
u0
 
cS

= 1; u
0  cW  = 2; (n)V 0  b0 = 2ne rF ; V 0 (b) = 1:
These equations can be written as (n)1 = 2ne rF , or in steady state:
cS = cW (n)1=;
where  (n)  (n)n erF = (n)erF < 1 which guarantees that the borrowing constraint binds. The
two budget constraints and this condition can be used to solve for cS , cW and b as:
cW =  (s; n) I(n; s;w);
cS =  (s; n) (n)1=I(n; s;w);
and
b =  (s; n) (n)1=
 
1  e rs I(n; s;w)=r;
where
 (s; n) =
r
1  e r(T s) + ne rF (n)1= (ers   1) :
In addition, in the steady state:
V (b) =
u
 
cS

(1  e rs) =r + u  cW   e rs   e rT  =r +A
1  (n)
=
1
1  
 
cW
1  
 (n)(1 )= (1  e rs) +  e rs   e rT  =r
1  (n) +
A
1  (n) :
Fertility The rst order condition with respect to fertility is:
0(n)V
 
b0

= 2
  e rsIn(n; s;w) + e rF b0 :
The left-hand-side is the marginal benet while the right-hand-side is the marginal cost. In steady
state, using the solutions for V and b :
1
1  
 
cW
1  h
 (n)(1 )=
 
1  e rs+  e rs   e rT i =r +A 0(n)
1  (n)
= 2e
 rsn(n; s;w) + 2e
 rF (s; n) (n)1=
 
1  e rs I(n; s;w)=r:
Suppose (n) = n1+n : Then
0(n) =

1 + n
  
2n
(1 + n)2
=
n
1 + n
1
n
  
2n2
(1 + n)2
1
n
=
(n)
n

1  n
1 + n

=
(n)
n
(1  (n)) =  (n) (1  (n)) e rF ;
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so that 
0(n)
1 (n) =  (n)e
 rF : In this case the rst order condition can be written as
2
h
e rsn(s; n;w) + e
 rF (s; n) (n)1=
 
1  e rs I(n; s;w)=ri
=

1
1  
 
cW
1  h
 (n)(1 )=
 
1  e rs+  e rs   e rT i =r +A 0(n)
1  (n)
=
e rF
1  c
W2
h
 (n)(1 )= (n)
 
1  e rs+  (n)  e rs   e rT i =r +  (n)e rFA
=
e rF2
1    (s; n) I(n; s;w)
h
 (n)1=
 
1  e rs+  (n)  e rs   e rT i =r +  (n)e rFA;
or collecting terms
e rsn(n; s;w) =
e rF =r
1    (s; n) I(n; s;w)
h
 (n)1=
 
1  e rs +  (n)  e rs   e rT i
+( (s; n) I(n; s; w))  (n)e rFA;
or
n(n; s;w)
I(n; s;w)
=
e rF (s; n) =r
1  
h
 (n)1= (ers   1) +  (n)

1  e r(T s)
i
+( (s; n)) (I(n; s;w)) 1  (n)e r(F s)A:
In order to simplify the expression above, consider the case when T =1. In this case the expression
simplies to
n(n; s;w)
I(n; s;w)
=
e rF (s; n) =r
1  
h
 (n)1= (ers   1) +  (n)
i
+( (s; n)) [I(n; s;w)] 1  (n)e r(F s)A
which corresponds to equation (24) in the text.
Schooling The rst order condition with respect to schooling is:
(u
 
cS
  u  cW )e rs +  2cW   1cS e rs + 2@ [e rsI(n; s;w)]
@s
= 0:
Note that without credit friction the previous equation becomes 2 [@ (e rsI(n; s;w)) =@s] = 0 so
that optimal schooling is the one that maximizes present value income. The equation above can
be written as:
2
@ [e rsI(n; s;w)]
@s
= 2
 re rsI(n; s;w) + e rsIs(n; s;w)
=
 
u
 
cW
  u  cS e rs +  1cS   2cW  e rs
=
 
u
 
cW
  u  cS e rs + (1  )  u  cS  u  cW  e rs
= 
 
u
 
cW
  u  cS e rs;
or 
Is(n; s;w)
I(n; s;w)
  r

I(n; s;w) = 
u
 
cW
  u  cS
u0 (cW )
=

1  
 
1  u
 
cS

u (cW )
!
cW ;
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or
Is(n; s;w)
I(n; s;w)| {z }
returns to schooling
= r +

1  
 
1  u
 
cS

u (cW )
!
 (s; n)| {z }
adjusted returns to savings
;
which corresponds to equation (25) in the text.
D Proofs - section 3
This appendix includes the proofs of all propositions for the model with fertility and schooling
(section 3).
Proof of Proposition 4 Consider rst the determinants of fertility in the frictionless case. As
shown in Appendix C, when the borrowing and the bequest constraints do not bind, then 1 = 2
and 3 = 4 = 0 so that using (37) into (36) we obtain
(n)V 0
 
b0

= V 0 (b) e rFn:
Along a steady state in which b = b0, the equation above determines optimal fertility n.
Proof of Proposition 5 Consider a marginal reallocation of consumption from the parent to his
n children. The parent reduces his age-0 consumption c0 in one unit and, in exchange, increases
the age-0 consumption of each of his n children c00 in the amount erF =n. This reallocation can be
obtained by adjusting bequests. The optimality condition for bequests therefore must satisfy the
condition @V=@c0 
 
erF =n
 @V=@c00, with equality if b0 > 0. In the steady state,
@V=@c0
@V=@c00
=
@V=@U  @U=@c0
(n) @V=@V 0  @V 0=@U 0  @U 0=@c00
=
1
n(n)
;
which implies that the bequest constraint is binding if 1 > (n)erF . Since (n) is strictly decreasing
in n then a su¢ cient condition for the bequest constraint to bind for any n is 1  (0)erF .
Proof of Proposition 6 Consider a marginal reallocation of consumption from the parent to his
n children. The optimality condition is u0
 
cW

= (n; F )u0
 
cS

erF =n which holds with equality
because optimal bequest are positive. On the other hand, the optimal choice of savings, a, implies
u0
 
cS
  u0  cW  which holds with equality if a > 0. These two conditions together imply that the
borrowing constraint binds if 1 > (n; F )erF =n. This is the case under Assumption 4.
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Figure 1. Consumption and fertility under constrained allocation 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
19.0
19.5
20.0
20.5
21.0
21.5
22.0
22.5
23.0
0.2 1.0 1.8 2.7 3.5 4.3 5.2 6.0 6.8 7.7 8.5 9.3 10.2 11.0 11.8 12.7 13.5 14.3 15.2 16.0
fe
rt
il
it
y
 
y
ea
rs
 o
f 
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
 
wage 
Figure 2. Schooling and fertility for various wage levels 
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Figure 3. Net financial benefit of  having a child 
